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14 April 1948

TO : Members of the Subcommittee

FROM: Ralph Block, Chairman, Subcommittee on  
Special Studies and Evaluations D.B.

The Subcommittee has had before it as unfinished business a further development in relation to the problem statements which were rationalized according to the memorandum of the Air Force Member of 20 January 1948.

In a review of the problems noted by the Subcommittee members, the Chairman has been impressed with the contemporary importance of two of the problems which have appeared in the statements of each member either directly or by implication. These are in brief:

a. The essentiality of a Domestic Information Branch and related problems.

b. The organizational requirements and relationships of special activities.

1. In any future war it may be assumed that the "development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home . . . . , of the status and progress of (the) war effort . . . . and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the government" and coordination of "the war information activities of all federal departments and agencies" will prove a more difficult and more complex task than was undertaken by OWI in World War II. The reasons for this increased difficulty and complexity is presumably clear to members of the Subcommittee and need not be restated here. However, a significant factor in this situation is that the impact of war in its most severe phases may be initially upon the civilian domestic population of the United States.

The question informally raised recently but apparently reflecting opinion on a high level was whether the discussion of domestic and overseas operations, as outlined in SAKAGC 304/12, would be adequate to the demands placed

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upon domestic operations of NSIA. The Chairman, therefore, suggests that this problem with all its corollaries be re-examined at an early date.

2. The requirements of early examination of the problem of special activities lies less in the imminence of the problem from the point of time than it does in the questions which seem to have been raised by 304/12.

From the earliest discussions of the Subcommittee, the need of a unified organizational concept for both white and black operations has never been seriously questioned in the Subcommittee. In addition, it may be pointed out that Appendix "B", 304/1, paragraph 10 d, states, "coordination of white and black psychological warfare is a necessity in any national effort". Such coordination in the discussions in the Subcommittee have always assumed that for security reasons certain aspects of black would be directed at a distance in the organizational setup from all other operations and as close as possible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Nevertheless, it may be assumed that this total concept of a unified command of black and white may be questioned. The Chairman, therefore, recommends that the entire problem be reexamined intensively with an open mind.

3. The Chairman will place these subjects upon the agenda for preliminary discussion in the Subcommittee Tuesday, April 20.

cc: Col. W. L. McNamee  
Capt. D. W. Knoll  
Col. Joseph Halversen  
Col. A. H. Rich  
Major Max Brokaw  
Wm. R. Tyler

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